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Introduction
The major characteristic of Western thought, centered around the notion
that rational, rationalistic reasoning is real understanding, is based on the
Enlightenment and progressive ideas which hold that mankind will
eventually reach a single correct perception and be able to build a just
society. Starting from the nineteenth century, but especially in the
twentieth century, various critiques of this view have emerged. With time,
these critiques seem to have advanced in number and improved in quality.
However, modern rationalistic reason has not been dethroned, and its
detractors have yet to offer a positive alternative, as we can learn from the
expression “deconstruction.”
Let me now call this problem of modern rationalistic reason and its
criticism the problem of the “reflection of modern rationalistic reason.”
How has contemporary sociology dealt with this problem of “reflection of
modern rationalistic reason”? This paper shows the achievements and the
problems of its attempt, and offers a direction to advance reflexive
sociology.
Let me first distinguish the two principal types of reflection that set
the framework for my argument. One is “transcendental reflection”; the
other is “hermeneutic reflection.” According to Yasusuke Murakami,
reflection in general can be divided into partial reflection and holistic
reflection. Holistic reflection reflects on all objects for its reinterpretation
while partial reflection limits itself to parts of objects. Holistic reflection is
further divided into two sets of reflections. The first is “transcendental
reflection” that centers on the post-reflective self, which is separated from
the lifeworld as it transcends the lifeworld. The second is “hermeneutic
reflection” which looks at the pre-reflective self that is embedded (again)
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in the lifeworld as its component.1 On this distinction, sociology would
mainly deal with hermeneutic reflection as a matter of fact.
The Rise of Reflexive Sociology
It was Alvin W. Gouldner who first proposed reflexive sociology in the
field of sociology. With Harold Garfinkel, he showed, that the background
assumption of everyday life, which is “seen-but-unnoticed,”2 is a departing
point from, and a returning point to, the lifeworld and an interpretive
framework for matters, and that this background assumption of everyday
life and its common rules stabilize, standardize and normalize everyday
life. Gouldner defines as historical what is not expected from this everyday
life: what is remote, what is not everyday life. According to Gouldner, this
historical existence and the everyday life constitute social theory. Thus, the
special task of reflexive sociology is to focus on the everyday world as a
foundation for theory. Certainly, a theorist’s interpretation of history and
everyday life is formed not solely from the background assumption that is
not observed. The theorist’s tradition of intellectual field and subculture
would play an important role. Theory would be shaped through and by way
of its interaction with these. A theorist naturally needs to implement
professional operational codes and reveal the level of life which has been
submerged under certain conditions.
When its task is defined this way, reflexive sociology can be
considered as dealing with a special case of sociological task which is not
so different from sociology in general. That is to say, reflexive sociology
shares with sociology the task of releasing the reality that has been
subordinated. Nevertheless, Gouldner considers that the task of reflexive
sociology slightly differs from that of sociology as it is normally understood.
The task of sociology in general is said to be one of discovering reality by
finding and identifying social laws and regularities. But Gouldner thinks
that the task of reflexive sociology can be better addressed as recovering
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what is already discovered instead of finding what is new. Another
important point relating to this is that sociology involves special research
that deals with humans who also look at human behavior. The target of
sociology cannot simply be an object; The target is defined by humans who
themselves participate, reflect, theorize and possess substantial knowledge
about life. In sociology, unlike natural science, there is no fundamental
difference between the subject and the object of cognition. Sociology and
its target of research constitute two cognitive communities which interact
and compete with each other. Gouldner thinks that one may not be able to
see the task of reflexive sociology fully unless one understands this point
well.
A reflection of the subject of cognition, when it rejects the perspective
that treats objects as things, and accepts the reflector’ s kinship and
common subjectivity with objects, reveals itself not only to professionals
but amateurs, and becomes capable of accepting their judgments. Only
when the reflection of the subject of cognition achieves this does its
reflection become an “interpretation” and not merely an explanation.
Accordingly, Gouldner thinks that reflexive sociology must be
“hermeneutic” and thus historical reflexive sociology.
Therefore, the task of reflexive sociology is to study everyday life
where its object recovers rather than discovers its features, and to help the
object become less like an object, and more like a subject, more capable of
understanding and controlling everyday life. Through research, sociology
has no choice but to intervene in, and change, the world.
The Development of Reflexive Sociology
After Gouldner, reflexive sociology develops into Pierre Bourdieu’ s
interpretation via reflexive sociology centered on the problem of reflection
on the system level and the problem of structure and agency as discussed
by Anthony Giddens and Urlich Beck.3
After showing that Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology aims at examining
reflexivity of cognition, Loïc Wacquant argues that Bourdieu’s reflection
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differs from others’ in three points. First, the main object of reflectivity is
not individual but the “social and intellectual unconscious embedded in
analytic tools and operations”4 of analysis. Secondly, it is a “collective
enterprise”5 rather than an attempt assigned to an individual scholar.
Thirdly, it “seeks not to assault but to buttress the epistemological security
of sociology”6. But Wacquant rather overemphasizes the uniqueness of
Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology. Gouldner’s reflexive sociology incorporates
the first point mainly through the “background assumption”; that Gouldner
stresses the theorist’s community as a medium between subject and object
suggests that he also fully understood the non-individual aspect of
reflection. Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology must be taken as a thorough
completion of Gouldner’s reflexive sociology.
Bourdieu’ s reflexive sociology rejects all the biases that distort
sociological perception. Such biases include class, nationality, ethnicity,
sex, academic position and intellectualism. This can itself be called
transcendental reflection since it denotes the operation where one
selectively excludes the dangers that might distort cognition and build up
post-reflective self. But Bourdieu’s reflection is never cut off from the pre-
reflective self. He has no dualism between the pre-reflective and the post-
reflective self. This is because the pre-reflective self is considered the
“socialized body,” “the repository of the generative and creative capacity
to understanding” or “the bearer of a form of ‘the kinetic knowledge’
endowed with structuring of potency”7. Thus, transcendental reflection
returns immediately to hermeneutic reflection again. His reflexive sociology
is “the work of objectivation of the objectivating subject”8. Bourdieu could
show himself as a developer of “Pascalian meditation”9. When we compare
his reflexive sociology with that of Gouldner’s, which is characterized by
dualism between consciousness and thing, Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology
must be evaluated as reflexive sociology at a higher stage.
The reflexive sociology built by Bourdieu analyzes the social as its
object, finds thence the original, indigenous universalities and creates
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universality as the consummation of those operations which collect,
compare and examine the indigenous universalities that have been found.
This is the direction that Western sociology now pursues. When it does so,
globalism and internationalism must embrace cosmopolitanism. It is
essential to relativize the idea of nation-state. Certainly, cosmopolitanism
is only a passing point.
Transcendental Reflection
As I said above, reflection can be divided into “hermeneutic reflection” and
“transcendental reflection.”Most sociology study is engaged in “hermeneutic,”
“historical” reflection as a “reflexive sociology.” In what follows, I will
advance my analysis of “transcendental reflection.” It is expected that
doing so further clarifies the nature and the problems of “hermeneutic
reflection.”
Yasusuke Murakami, who divided holistic reflection into “hermeneu-
tic reflection” and “transcendental reflection,” regards “transcendental
reflection” as that which stresses the post-reflective self, cuts the “self” off
from the lifeworld and establishes it as a cognitive subject transcending the
lifeworld. He clarified the features of this reflection through the following
logic.10
This reflection can never reach a holistic reflection no matter how
often it repeats reflection. Thus, it must go through an endless “process of
transcendentalization” and “upward progression.” Therefore, “transcendental
reflection” discovers historic religion (Robert Bellah11). This is because
historic religion exempted one from transcendentalization by “introducing
absolute God or principles” and also by offering “practical guidance about
transcendental or quasi-transcendental thought for human beings.” Among
historic religions, Christianity was especially useful for Western
“transcendental reflection.” This is because it offered absolute principles
and was capable of directing one’s attention to the lifeworld. Descartes’ so-
called dualism opened up a channel for the shift of interest from religion to
the lifeworld. As a result, natural science developed rapidly. This is how
“transcendental reflection” came to be represented by “natural scientific,
lawful reflection.”
Mr. Murakami’s argument, shown just above, is an extremely
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perceptive argument deserving high consideration. But there is one big
problem with this argument. Such an argument as his is trapped in a vulgar
discussion of Descartes’ philosophy and fails to capture the strand of
thought that attempts to overcome modern philosophy, including the
thought of Descartes, Spinoza, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Marx, Freud, Lévi-
Strauss and Wittgenstein. This results in the failure to grasp the differing
meanings of transcendental reflection. In what follows, I will look into this
point, based on Kojin Karatani’s argument.12
First, Karatani says, modern philosophy treats subject as classification
or concept, not as singularity. It transforms singularity into particularity
and manages to connect particularities by placing an assumption of
intersubjectivity. Singularity suggests and assumes the asymmetry or
difference between self and the other as such. This is expressed through the
proper noun. A proper noun does not express individuality: It expresses
singularity. What should be noted further is that a proper noun exists inside
and outside language at the same time. A proper noun cannot be translated
in either a foreign or a native language. The externality of proper nouns in
language suggests that language cannot be reduced to the closed langue
and the sociality of language. A proper noun assumes a social existence
rather than a common existence.13 We should not forget this.
Moreover, according to Karatani, a proper noun denotes “none-other-
than-this-ness.” “None-other-than-this-ness” means not simply that “it is
not other,” it means “it-actually-is-even-though-it-could-be-otherwise.” If
so, in order to talk about a proper noun, we must think about the modalities
of “possibility, actuality, contingency and necessity.” A proper noun tries
to maintain itself by fixating the none-other-than-this-ness and excluding
the otherness=many possibilities. That assumes otherness and the contingency
of relations.14 Thus, the problem of proper nouns comes down to the
problem of communication, which cannot establish itself without “the leap
of life and death.”
Now, Karatani faces the task of overcoming modern philosophy in
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order to deal with singularity and proper nouns in a sufficient manner. The
objective of that task is to overcome the dualism between mind and body.
This dualism is generally attributed to Descartes. However, according to
Karatani, Descartes tries to overcome this dualism. Descartes’ spirit aims at
rejecting this dualism. Karatani quotes the famous passage from Descartes’
Discourse on Method :
I resolved to feign that all the things that had ever entered in my mind
were no more true than the illusions of my dreams. But, immediately
afterward, I took note that, while I wanted thus to think that
everything was false. It necessarily had to be that I, who was thinking
this, was something. And noticing that this truth―I think, therefore I
am―was so firm and so assured that all the most extravagant
suppositions of the skeptics were not capable of shaking it, I judged
that I could accept it, without scruple, as the first principle of the
philosophy that I was seeking.15
What does cogito ergo summean? According to Karatani, “in Descartes, ‘I
doubt’ is a personal determination of will.” And this ‘I’ is a singular
existence, which refers to Descartes himself (1). In a sense, (1) is an
empirical self, and simultaneously the doubting subject (2), who doubts
the empirical subject (1); through this process the transcendental ego (3)
is discovered”16. Descartes asks who I am apart from all the systems. And
Descartes answers this question by saying that I exist because I think and
doubt. Thus, Descartes’ thinking is consciousness or self-consciousness
and at the same time is outside consciousness or self-consciousness.
The location of the spirit is in the discursive space and not in the
geographical space. And the spirit is shown in a formal way, deductively.
But it is utterly “private” and does not have any base. What ultimately
grounds it, then, is world, nature or what can only be called God.
In summation, Karatani argues that we must stand outside the system
to which self belongs and searches for the infinite idea=God. This is what
Descartes did. And the person who continues this line of thought is
Spinoza. Of course, this God is not God as representation (identification of
language), illusion or consciousness. It is God as an idea or definition. The
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idea we talk about here cannot be represented empirically. But it is
something whose existence we cannot deny; nor can we deny the place in
which one looks at transcendence itself as representation. If we follow the
arguments through the relationship between concepts, we can depict them
as in the following figure.
Idea
Universality
Concept Generality Particularity
Singularity
Idea and Concept, Singularity and Particularity
(Kojin Karatani, Tankyu II (in Japanese), Kodansha, 1994, p.150)
We can understand God as an idea which differs from a concept by dealing
with infinity. In infinite space, the system is closed and everything belongs
to it. No dualism will be necessary, and we can put an end to endless
transcendence.
Karatani tries to dig into the problem of overcoming modern thought,
and focuses primarily on Spinoza. Karatani maintains that Spinoza’ s
subject is not a cognitive subject. This fact is made clear when a cognitive
subject is doubted and criticized. It can be called a transcendental subject,
subject as singularity. The impossibility of transcending the world, the
attitude of singularity (only this I, only this world) is different from self-
consciousness or reflexivity. It is precisely this fact that creates society’s
thinking and universality, transcending the community’ s thinking and
generality (common subjectivity) which stays in a single world.
The nature of the givenness of everything must be clarified by the
work of the transcendental subject. This is called critical, archeological
thinking. It is important that the asymmetrical relation between the self and
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the other is made clear by critical, archeological thinking. Karatani calls the
asymmetrical relation between the self and the other as “society” and
defines “community” as the symmetrical relation of having the same rules.
Social science has a critical, archeological approach dealing with society as
its object. Thus, social science aims at clarifying as its object the givenness
of communication, transportation and exchange which appears as an
asymmetrical relation between the self and the other17.
Tentative Conclusion
This paper clarifies how universality is pursued in modern sociology by
tracing the establishment and development of reflexive sociology. It also
elucidates the argument that stresses, in the attempts to overcome modern
philosophy, the importance of the transcendental subject that does not
assume common subjectivity, a notion absent in modern sociology, and the
meaning of that argument. The two aspects that are reflexive sociology and
the argument that stresses the importance of a transcendental subject look
similar in terms of emphasizing the lifeworld, but they come to differ
significantly. But does not the development of globalization and of
planetarization show us the need for modern sociology to realize the
importance of the transcendental subject?
This kind of sociology already exists. Alberto Melucci’s reflexive
sociology is one example. According to Melucci, “Finally, the planetary
extension of the world system has by now acquired a total scope: countries
and cultures only exist as inner dimensions of a global system. This new
‘internalization’ introduces a fourth dilemma, that between inclusion and
exclusion. Inclusion irons out differences and transforms peripheral
cultures into insignificant and quaint appendages to the few centres where
languages are elaborated and diffused through the great market of the
media. Any resistance to this standardization almost inevitably leads to
exclusion, spelling silence and cultural death”18. But Melucci also thinks
that “individuals gain wider control over the formation and orientation of
their action”19. Namely, he understands that the self-reflective capacity of
individuals to produce communication and solidarity can grow at the same
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University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p.127.
19 Alberto Melucci, ibid., p.3.
time. His sociology takes the body and language as “the foundations of an
ethic responding to the need to cope with the problems of a planet.”20
Therefore, his sociology is an attempt to learn to move between body and
language. Through this sociology, we can understand that we are social
existences and that we can live with others.
At the end of this investigation, I would like to point out one more
thing related with the history of sociology. As I stated earlier, the social
thought of Descartes, Spinoza, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche Marx, Freud and
Wittgenstein are very important to sociology. Therefore, we have to
include these social thoughts in the history of sociology and to examine the
relationship between these thoughts and sociology. For example, F.
Tönnies investigated the revision of the medieval world view and the
philosophy of Hobbes and Spinoza.21 Of course, we have to deploy critical,
archeological research or historical sociology that deals with the
asymmetrical relation between the self and the other as its object.
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